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A B S T R A C T  A R T I C L E   I N F O 
Paper examines the impact of a going-concern audit opinion on the 
corporate governance, measured by the changes in board of directors’ 
composition. External auditor’s opinion is used as a measure to address 
agency problems in companies. We examine this impact on sample of 55 
companies listed on the Banja Luka Stock Exchange which have received 
going-concern audit opinion for 2013 financial reports. In this paper, the 
relationship between going-concern audit opinion and the corporate 
governance is investigated observing changes in board of director 
composition and additional requests for rigorous board performance 
evaluation after the shareholder’s assembly have received external 
auditor’s report. Results show that board of directors of companies that 
received going-concern audit opinions have not suffered serious 
consequences such as rigorous board performance evaluation, reduction of 
board size or changes of board members. This highlights the importance of 
measures that need to be put in place in order to increase of external 
auditor’s role in corporate governance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW   
 
According to agency theory, agency problems arise as a result of the divergence of interests 
among agents and principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Miller, 
2002), that is managers and shareholders. The agency problem of information asymmetry 
arises because managers have superior information about the company’s business and 
financial situation than the stakeholders.  
Klein et. al. (2002) observe that “in corporate finance, asymmetric information refers to the 
nation that firm insiders, typically the managers, have better information that do market 
participants on the value of their firm’s assets and investment opportunities”. 
 
Voluntary disclosures by managers and Board of Directors prevent information asymmetry 
between shareholders and management to a certain extent (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). 
One of the most important corporate governance principle of transparency and public 
disclosure is aimed at reducing information asymmetry in companies (Todorovic et. al., 
2013). 
 
Regulatory changes and improvements in corporate governance principles, financial reporting 
and auditing standards and enforcements of these regulations by shareholders, investors and 
other players in capital markets support the agency theory problem and confirm the 
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importance of external auditing and corporate governance in financial reporting (Cadburry, 
1992; Hampel, 1998; Blue Ribbon, 1998; SOX, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 1: Role of external auditor between owners and managers 
 
 
As shown in Figure 1. the existence of an external audit reviews is one of the important 
factors decreasing information asymmetry. Auditor’s opinion plays an important role in 
mitigating agency problems in company between shareholders and managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Audit review and report is an important mechanism for reducing 
information asymmetry (Beatty, 1989; Willenborg, 1999). Therefore, shareholders hire 
external auditors to assure that managers act in their best interest (Antle, 1982; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986).  
 
Studies show that audit reports signal increased reliability of financial statements (Coram, 
Mock, Turner and Gray, 2011) and that the auditor’s going-concern modified report 
communicates valuable information about risk to investors (Blay, Geiger and North, 2011) 
and shareholders. As a result, market responds adversely to a going-concern report (Blay and 
Geiger, 2001; Menon and Williams, 2010). 
 
In paper we examine the relationship between and impact of an external auditor’s going-
concern opinion on the corporate governance. We use external auditor’s opinion as a measure 
to address agency problems in sample companies. When external auditor expresses report 
with going-concern suspect or opinion, it means that the auditors raise doubts of the 
company’s ongoing ability (Casterlla, Lewis and Walker, 2001), practices of corporate 
governance and Board of Directors’ ability to govern company well. As external auditor has 
indicated and raise doubt about running the company Board of Directors of these companies 
should suffer serious consequences such as rigorous board performance evaluation, reduction 




PAGE 89| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2016, VOL. 3, NO. 1 
2. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS   
 
Paper examines the impact of a going-concern audit opinion on the corporate governance, 
measured by the changes in board of directors’ composition. External auditor’s opinion is 
used as a measure to address principal agent problems in companies.  
 
Out of 269 companies which have received and disclosed auditor’s report for FY 2013 we 
have selected sample of 55 companies listed on the Banja Luka Stock Exchange which have 
received going-concern audit opinion for FY 2013 financial reports. Therefore, we examine 
this impact on a full population of companies which have received going-concern audit 
opinion.  
 
In this paper, the relationship between going-concern audit opinion and the corporate 
governance is investigated observing changes in board of director composition after the 
shareholder’s assembly have received external auditor’s report. Moreover, to further 
understand monitoring and control practices we investigate whether shareholder’s assembly 
requested additional and rigorous board performance evaluation. 
 
To offer useful answers to the research problem and realize the objectives, the following 
hypotheses were tested: 
 
H1. External auditor’s going-concern opinion has impact on Corporate Governance practices 
of companies. 
 
H2. External auditor’s going-concern opinion leads to consequence to the Board of Directors. 
 
H2.1. External auditor’s going-concern opinion leads to changes in Board of 
Directors’ composition. 
 
H2.2. External auditor’s going-concern opinion leads to additional and rigorous Board 
performance evaluation. 
 
To test research hypotheses, we have collected data from the Banja Luka Stock Exchange 
database, annual reports and companies’ web pages regarding: 
• auditor’s reports for FY 2013, 
• shareholders assembly meetings, 
• shareholders assembly meetings decisions, 
• changes in Board of Directors structure, and 
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3. RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
Research data collected on companies which have received going-concern audit opinion for 
FY 2013 financial reports from different sources was analysed and presented in Table 1. (by 
number of companies) and Figures 2 to 5. (in percentage of total observed companies).  
 
 
Table 1: Impact of auditor’s going-concern opinion  
 Yes No Total 
Discussed Auditors Report on Shareholders Assembly 
Meeting 
50 5 55 
Changes in Board of Directors Composition 13 42 55 
Requested Additional Board Performance Evaluation 1 54 55 
Source: Authors’ research  
 
 
Table 2. shows reasons for expressing going-concern opinion at sample companies from the 
Banja Luka Stock Exchange and that main reason for expressing going-concern opinion is 
significantly higher short-term debt than current assents. These reasons indicate problems in 
practices of corporate governance and Board of Directors’ ability to govern company well. 
 
Table 2: Reasons for expressing going-concern opinion 
Reason No. of companies 
Significantly higher short-term debt than 
current assents 
26 
Significant losses 9 
Loss over the capital 11 
Potential illiquidity or loss 9 
Total  55 
Source: Kondic and Poljasevic, 2015 
 
Figure 2. shows that majority of companies, 91% or 50 companies discuss auditor’s report on 
shareholder’s assembly meeting. However, 9% or 5 companies did not discuss auditor’s 
report on shareholder’s assembly meeting, indicating that some companies do not realise 
importance of external auditor report on company’s business specially when external auditor 
raises doubt of the company’s ongoing ability, practices of corporate governance and Board 
of Directors’ ability to govern company well. 
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Figure 2: Discussed Auditors Report on Shareholders Assembly Meeting 
 
Figure 3. indicated that majority of sample companies, 76% or 42 companies, have not made 
any changed to Board of Directors composition and changed its members even dough external 
auditor raised doubts of the company’s ongoing ability, practices of corporate governance and 
Board of Directors’ ability to govern company well. Only 24% or 13 companies have made 
changes to Board of Directors’ after the shareholder’s assembly have received and discussed 
external auditor’s report. 
 
 
Figure 3: Changes in Board of Directors Composition 
 
Data from Figure 4. shows number of changes by 13 companies that have made changes to 
Board of Directors’ after the shareholder’s assembly have received and discussed external 
auditor’s report. Most of companies have requested a change of 1 or 2 board members, while 
there is one company that has changed entire Board after going-concern audit opinion. Also, 
we have encountered 3 companies which have changed members of Board of Directors but 
did not disclose number and names of members that have been changed. On average, these 13 
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Analysis of data shown in Table 1., Figure 3. and 4. for sample companies from the Banja 
Luka Stock Exchange indicate that external auditors’ going-concern opinion does not lead to 
changes in Board of Directors’ composition, which rejects hypothesis H2.1. 
 
 
Figure 4: Number of Changes in Board of Directors by Company 
 
 
To further understand monitoring and control practices we investigate whether shareholder’s 
assembly requested additional and rigorous board performance evaluation after receiving 
going-concern audit opinion. Figure 5. shows that only one company, out of 55 companies, 
have requested additional and rigorous board performance evaluation. This indicates that 
shareholders do not perceive external auditor’s opinion to play important role as a mechanism 
for reducing information asymmetry even dough shareholders hire external auditor to assure 
that managers act in their best interest. Therefore, our analysis of sample companies rejects 
research hypothesis H2.2.  
 
As results show that shareholders do not perceive external auditor’s opinion to play important 
role in reducing agency problem between shareholders and managers (Board of Directors) we 
also have to reject hypothesis H2. which indicate that external auditor’s going-concern 
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Figure 5: Requested Additional Board Performance Evaluation by Shareholder’s Assembly 
 
 
As external auditors have indicated and raise doubt about running the company by expressing 
going-concern opinion, Board of Directors of sample companies should suffer serious 
consequences from its shareholders such as rigorous board performance evaluation, reduction 
of board size or changes of board members. 
 
However, taking into consideration above results and analysis of the relationship between 
going-concern audit opinion and the corporate governance which was investigated observing 
changes in board of director composition and requests for additional and rigorous board 
performance evaluation after the shareholder’s assembly have received external auditors 
report we also reject hypothesis H1. which state that external auditor’s going-concern opinion 




4. CONCLUSION   
 
Regulatory changes in corporate governance principles, financial reporting and auditing 
standards have emphasized importance of external auditor’s opinion in corporate governance 
as auditor’s opinion plays important role mitigating agency problems and information 
asymmetry in company between shareholders and managers. 
 
Therefore, as external auditor expresses going-concern opinion and raise doubt about the 
company’s ongoing ability, practices of corporate governance and Board of Directors’ ability 
to govern company well, Board of Directors should suffer serious consequences. 
 
Results show that Board of Directors of sample companies that received going-concern audit 
opinions have not suffered serious consequences such as rigorous board performance 
evaluation, reduction of board size or changes of board members. This highlights the 
importance of measures that need to be put in place in order to increase of external auditor’s 
role in corporate governance. 
Based on results we have rejected all research hypothesis which indicates that in sample 
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practices of companies and does not lead to consequence to the Board of Directors. 
Shareholders of these companies do not use external auditor’s opinion to mitigate agency 
problems and reduce information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. 
This implies that shareholders are not active in running a company and controlling do 
managers act in their best interest. If they want to protect their ownership and interest in 
company shareholders have to be active in monitoring and control over company’s activities. 
This type of activism focuses on the financial performance of companies and puts pressure on 
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